HomeUIC Research Journalvol. 18 no. 2 (2012)

Being-for-Itself as Freedom: A Preliminary Inquiry on Jean-Paul Sartre’s Philosophy of the Human Person

Asisclo Iii M. Abonado

Discipline: Philosophy, Humanities

 

Abstract:

Being-for-Itself as Freedom: A Preliminary Inquiry on Jean-Paul Sartre’s Philosophy of the Human Person exposes the principles behind Sartre’s assertion of the human person as condemned by his own freedom and as a useless passion. In pursuit of developing reasons and meaning of Sartrean concept of Human Person, the researcher employed qualitative-descriptive design guided by the method of hermeneutics. The findings manifest two essential points on Being and Nothingness. Sartre talks about essence and appearances which are the two aspects of Being. Essence and appearances are one. Essence is just a chain in the series of appearances. However, Sartre also speaks about Nothingness and affirms the permanent possibility of non-being. For him, non-being is the limitation of one’s inquiry on what exists, and that is the realm beyond being. Hence, it is to say that nothingness is that which exists outside what is existent (i.e., Being), and conversely, ‘Being is that and outside of that nothing. Indeed, Being and Nothingness are both what really exist. They imply the ‘evident and ‘non-evident’. Another point is that man is enmeshed into existence. He is related with his absurd world of muddling events. And since this world makes no sense, he finds no universal principles in it nor any moral standards. Upon his realization, he encounters his dreadful freedom because, as Sartre affirms, man’s freedom is absolute and radical. It implies that man is completely free and his freedom is far-reaching.