The objective of this work is to investigate Karol WojtyÅ‚a’s metaethics. Following the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition, he maintains that ethics is a science. Contrary to the Aristotelian tradition, which conceives ethics as a practical science, WojtyÅ‚a sustains that ethics is also a science with theoretical objectivity. He posits the human “experience of morality,†in a specific sense, the moral experience of “I ought to do x,†as the ground for the objectivity of ethics as science. He also critiques the understanding of experience as merely a sense-perception and appearance/phenomenon in empiricism and phenomenalism. However, it maintains the phenomenological understanding of experience as “livedexperience.†Thus, this work is an attempt to flesh out Karol Wojtyla’s meta-ethics by investigating the following: 1. Karol WojtyÅ‚a’s Philosophy of Person as an Efficacious Moral Person. 2. WojtyÅ‚a’s Objectivity of Experience as Subjective Fact. 3. Exposition of his Understanding of Ethics. 4. Discussion of the experience of “I ought to do xâ€: As the Moral Ground in Karol WojtyÅ‚a’s Meta-Ethics. 5. A critical Evaluation and Conclusion.